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RUNNING HEAD: Comparing to the ingroup versus the outgroup 
Abstract 
Previous work studying social comparisons suggests that people are likely to assimilate to 
ingroup members (e.g., Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007), but can also contrast from ingroup 
members if outgroup members are present (Blanton, Miller, & Dye, 2002). The present research 
built upon these findings by including a no-comparison control group to test for true contrast and 
assimilation effects. Across two studies, women primed with a gender-math stereotype 
received  false feedback about their performance on a math task; and in some conditions, they 
learned of the performance of ostensible male and/or female co-participants. Relative to a no-
comparison control, we did not see evidence of ingroup assimilation in either study. However, in 
both studies, we found that participants were likely to contrast their self-evaluations away from 
downward targets, regardless of group membership. This suggests that self-enhancement 
motivations may be stronger than the drive for ingroup assimilation. 
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People often rely on social comparison information when evaluating their own abilities or 
characteristics (Festinger, 1954; Suls, Martin, & Wheeler, 2002). Much comparison research 
simply examines how people respond to comparison information from better off or worse off 
others. However, there has been very little research examining how people use social comparison 
information specifically when experiencing stereotype threat; a search of the literature yields 
only 15 publications that discuss both fields, and even fewer that examine how threat influences 
the effects of comparison. This gap in the social comparison literature could have important 
implications for understanding how stereotype threat can affect people in real world settings. For 
example, if a woman learns about her performance on a math task, the comparison information 
might have a different effect depending on whether it comes from another woman or a man, 
especially if the negative stereotype about women’s math abilities is emphasized. If certain 
comparisons improved her feelings about her math ability, this could buffer against future 
threats; however, if a comparison resulted in feeling even worse about math ability, threat effects 
could be compounded for future tasks. Additionally, studying the effects of social comparison in 
a stereotype threat setting can offer insights as to how both processes influence self-
evaluations.  Research suggests that comparisons with ingroup and outgroup members can yield 
different outcomes (e.g., Hall & Crisp, 2008), especially when group membership is important 
for the domain. As such, the present research seeks to understand how people socially compare 
with ingroup versus outgroup members, specifically in situations when negative stereotypes 
about the group are made salient. 
Comparisons Under Threat  
Much research has focused on how people use social comparison information when 
experiencing ego threat in general; a large body of work points to the idea that when 
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experiencing threat, people are more likely to seek out downward comparison targets (Friend & 
Gilbert, 1973; Hakmiller, 1966; Vohs & Heatherton, 2004; Wills, 1981), and to use comparison 
information to form more favorable self-evaluations (e.g., Beer, Chester, & Hughes, 2013; 
Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985). Overall, this work demonstrates that many kinds of threat 
lead to people using social comparison in self-enhancing ways. However, there is less known 
about how people compare when they are threatened by their own social identity.  
  Stereotype Threat. Stereotype threat effects occur when members of a stigmatized group 
are faced with a stereotype-relevant task (e.g., Steele, 1997); despite efforts to perform well, 
people experiencing stereotype threat often confirm the stereotype. For example, when women 
were told that gender differences were expected on a math test (versus that there were no gender 
differences on the particular test), they performed worse on the task (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 
1999). Stereotype threat effects have been found for African Americans and Latino students and 
academics (Brown & Lee, 2005), elderly adults and reaction time (Lambert et al., 2016), and 
white students and performance on a race-based implicit association test (Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, 
Ray, & Hart, 2004). Importantly for this work, there is also ample evidence of stereotype threat 
affecting women’s performance in cognitive and physical domains as widespread as visuospatial 
assignments (Campbell & Collaer, 2009), math ability tests, (Tomasetto, Alparone, & Cadinu, 
2011), specific athletic tasks (Hively & El-Alayli, 2014), and financial decision making (Carr & 
Steele, 2010). In addition to affecting performance on stereotype relevant tasks, stereotype threat 
also leads to disengagement from stereotyped tasks or domains (e.g., Steele, 1997), decreased 
practice or self-handicapping (e.g., Stone, 2002), or decreased identification with the stereotyped 
group (e.g., Cohen & Garcia, 2008).   
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Stereotype threat and social comparison. Relatively little work has focused on how 
stereotype threat and social comparison can intersect. Some research suggests that comparison 
targets can actually induce stereotype threat. Hall and Crisp (2008) demonstrated that women 
(who strongly identified with their gender) performed worse on a math test after being primed 
with men by writing an essay about things men typically do. However, women who were low-
identifiers with their gender performed better after being primed with the concept of men. In 
other words, they contrasted away from their group prime.   
Marx, Stapel, and Muller (2005) demonstrated that women experiencing stereotype threat 
performed better on a math test after comparing to a woman who was described as very good at 
math and likely to pursue a quantitative graduate degree than after comparing to a woman who 
was described as bad at math and likely to pursue a career in acting. In other words, comparing 
to an ingroup member who defied the stereotype helped buffer against the typical stereotype 
threat effects.  
There is also evidence that social comparison can influence self-evaluations when 
experiencing a social identity threat. Redersdorff and Martinot (2009) studied psychology majors 
whose majors were framed as either high status (in comparison to philosophy majors) or low 
status (in comparison to pre-med majors). When their ingroup was described as being low in 
status (but not high), participants felt better about themselves if an ingroup member 
outperformed them. In other words, when part of a lower status (i.e. “stigmatized”) group, 
participants assimilated their self-evaluations to upward ingroup targets. Related research 
(Mackie, 1984) suggests that when an ethnic group identity is described as low status, children 
are more likely to report that their ingroup members are better-off, whereas that their outgroup 
members are worse-off than they are.  
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In a study that tested stereotype threat more specifically, Blanton, Crocker, and Miller 
(2000) had African American women complete a difficult “IQ” measure of “natural math ability” 
with either another African American woman or a white woman (both of whom were 
confederates). Participants learned that they scored in the 67th percentile and then found out 
from overhearing the experimenter that their ostensible co-participant had scored either in the 
20th percentile or the 99th percentile before rating their performance self-esteem. They argued 
that participants assimilated to ingroup members and contrasted from outgroup members. More 
specifically, when they were comparing to another African American woman (i.e., an ingroup 
member), they felt better about themselves when they were outperformed. However, when they 
were comparing to a white woman (i.e., an outgroup member), participants felt worse about 
themselves when they were outperformed than when they had performed better than the co-
participant. Overall, evidence from these three studies suggests that stereotype or social identity 
threat is likely to lead to ingroup assimilation and outgroup contrast.  
In a conceptually related study, Blanton, Christie, and Dye (2002) tested how women felt 
after comparing to both ingroup members (another woman) or outgroup members (a man). In 
this study, women completed a math and spatial abilities task and then found out that she had 
earned a score of 67 out of 100 and that her co-participants had earned a 99 and a 35 out of 100. 
It was manipulated whether it was the ingroup member who was performing better or worse than 
the participant. They also manipulated stereotype salience; in the low salience condition, 
participants were told that most college students could solve the math problems regardless of 
their training, and in the high salience condition, the experimenter suggested that men might 
perform better on the task. When the stereotype salience was low, participants felt better about 
their own performance when their ingroup co-participant had performed better (i.e., when both 
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the participant and the woman co-participant had done better than the man); however, when the 
stereotype salience was high participants felt better about their own performance when they had 
outperformed their ingroup co-participant. The authors refer to this as a kind of shifting 
standards-- when a stereotype about gender and math ability was made salient, the male target 
might have become irrelevant, so the women only compared (i.e., contrasted) to the other 
woman’s score. In a second study, they demonstrated that stereotype endorsement moderated 
how social comparison information was used under threat; women who endorsed the stereotype 
that men are better at math than women were more likely to “shift standards” and evaluate the 
self more favorable when outperforming another woman, whereas women who did not endorse 
this stereotype felt better about themselves when they and another women outperformed a man.  
While other studies have demonstrated assimilation to ingroup members when 
experiencing stereotype threat, the results of Blanton et al. (2002) suggest that contrast from 
ingroup members might be likely under certain situations; particularly situations in which 
stereotype salience and endorsement are high. So why these differences? Blanton (2001) offers 
an explanation that gender may be unique in terms of its effects on group-experience, and 
therefore on social comparison processes; for example, Blanton argues that in a person-to-person 
interaction, gender is not as distinct of a feature as something like race or ethnicity so it might 
not even activate a social identity. However, the research described above by Marx and 
colleagues (2005) and Hall and Crisp (2008) suggests that gender can be a “grouping” factor 
when gender stereotypes are made more salient, and that women are likely to assimilate to 
ingroup primes in these situations. Additionally, work by Ledgerwood and Chaiken (2007) 
suggests that people are more likely to assimilate to ingroup primes when the ingroup is broad 
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versus narrow. As such, it does seem possible that gender would be considered a relevant and 
distinct grouping variable, especially when a negative gender stereotype is made salient.  
The goal of the present work is to test how women compare to ingroup members when 
outgroup members are absent versus present. Based on work described above, we would predict 
that when comparing only to ingroup members (i.e., other women), women should assimilate 
their self-evaluations to their comparison targets; however, when women are comparing to both 
ingroup and outgroup members, we would predict that women would “shift standards” (as seen 
in Blanton et al., 2002) and contrast away from their ingroup members. Ledgerwood and 
Chaiken (2007) demonstrated that primes result in assimilation when they are providing context, 
but contrast when providing a distinct point of comparison. For gender, we argue that the 
presence of ingroup members only might provide “context”, but the presence of an outgroup 
member could shift the focus of the ingroup member to become a distinct point of comparison or 
even competition.   
True Contrast and Assimilation? An additional alternative explanation for the findings 
discussed above is that results were misinterpreted as being assimilation and contrast. Recent 
work (Bruchmann, 2017) demonstrates that without a no-comparison control group, it is 
impossible to make claims of true assimilation or contrast. It is possible that one or more of the 
conditions in these studies would not be different from a baseline self-evaluation. Perhaps, given 
the tendency to self-enhance when experiencing threat, people would be more likely to contrast 
away from downward targets than upward and more likely to assimilate to upward targets than 
downward-- regardless of group membership. Including a no-comparison control condition 
would further the understanding of how comparison information is used when in situations 
where stereotypes are activated.  
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The Present Research 
 The present study tests how women compare to ingroup and outgroup members both 
independently and together. After being primed with gender stereotypes, female participants 
completed a math test and learned they earned a mid-range score (in the control condition, this is 
all they learned). Some participants also learned that they had performed better or worse than a 
female or male co-participant-- in other words, they compared only to an ingroup or an outgroup 
member who had done better or worse. In these conditions, based on the prior work suggesting 
ingroup assimilation and outgroup contrast, we expected that participants’ self-evaluations be 
more positive when they were outperformed by ingroup members or had outperformed an 
outgroup member, and less positive when they were outperformed by outgroup members or had 
outperformed an ingroup member. However, by including no-comparison control group, we will 
be able to determine whether assimilation and contrast is happening in both directions. In other 
conditions, participants learned that their performance was directly in between a female and a 
male co-participants’; that is, participants compared to both ingroup and outgroup members. In 
these conditions, we expected that participants would have more positive self-evaluations when 
performing better than their ingroup member than when performing worse than ingroup 
members. If the presence of an outgroup member makes people more likely to contrast away 
from ingroup members (the idea of “shifting standards”), then we would predict that people 
evaluate themselves more positively (than control) when they outperform an ingroup member 
when an outgroup member is present, and less positively (than control) when an outgroup 
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Participants and Design. Female undergraduate students (N=163, 42.5% non-white, 
Mage= 18.84 years, SDage=.95 years) participated in exchange for partial course credit. Participants 
were either at the lab session alone, or were with another female co-participant, a male 
confederate, or both. Participants were randomly assigned to one of seven conditions where they 
compared themselves to no one (control), a female who performed better (female upward) or 
worse (female downward), a male who performed better (male upward) or worse (male 
downward), both a female who performed better and a male who performed worse (female 
upward and male downward), or both a male who performed better and a female who performed 
worse (male upward and female downward).  
Materials and Procedure. Participants were informed by a female experimenter that 
they would be helping to standardize a new type of math test known as modular arithmetic for a 
college sample (cover story adapted from Van Loo, Boucher, Rydell, & Rydell, 2013). To induce 
stereotype threat, the experimenter went on to explain that preliminary research has suggested 
that modular arithmetic problems provided a better assessments of “natural math ability” than 
other math tests, but that the data typically demonstrate a gender difference “such that men 
typically perform better than women” and that the present study was aiming to learn more about 
the reason behind this gender difference (manipulation adapted from Beilock et al., 2007, & 
Blanton et al., 2000).  
Modular Arithmetic Exam. Participants began the study by learning how to complete 
modular arithmetic (MA). MA equations take the form of  a≡b (mod c) and are solved by 
subtracting b from a and then dividing by c. If the resulting answer is an integer, the answer is 
“true”, and if it is not an integer, the answer is “false”. After learning the process and going 
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through two practice items, participants completed 50 MA items (adapted from Beilock et al., 
2007, and Van Loo et al., 2013).  
Social Comparison Feedback. When participants had all completed the MA exam, the 
experimenter told them that she would be retrieving their score reports from a printer in the next 
room; upon returning, she passed out a score report to each present participant with their own 
score highlighted. In reality, the score-reports were all pre-printed and a bogus score of 81% 
correct was highlighted. In the control condition, this is the only information that was indicated 
on the score report. In the experimental conditions, participants could also see the (bogus) scores 
and gender of any other participants. The co-participants’ scores were either upward 
comparisons (98%), downward comparisons (64%), or both upward and downward comparisons 
in the conditions where two others were present. See Table 1 for complete score report 
information across conditions for both studies.  
Dependent Measures. Next, on pencil and paper, participants completed the dependent 
measures. First, they indicated how they would rate their performance, and how satisfied they 
were with their performance on the MA task (1= extremely poor/dissatisfied, 7= extremely 
good/satisfied). Participants also indicated how they would rate their ability on modular 
arithmetic, and on math in general (1= extremely poor, 7= extremely good). 
State Self-Esteem. Participants next completed the 7-item performance subscale from the 
State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991); participants indicated their agreement with 
items including “I feel confident about my abilities” and “I feel as smart as others” (1= not at all, 
5= extremely).   
Perceptions of Modular Arithmetic. Next, participants rated how much they liked 
modular arithmetic as a way to measure math ability (1= dislike very much, 5= like very much), 
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and how much they liked modular arithmetic compared to other math problems (1= strongly 
prefer modular arithmetic, 5= strongly prefer standard math). Finally, participants were probed 
for suspicion, and were debriefed.  
Results 
 Modular Arithmetic Performance. The modular arithmetic items were scored and 
accuracy was calculated dividing the total score by 50 (the total number of items). On average, 
participants answered 85.51% (SD=15%) of the items correctly (significantly higher than the 
bogus feedback of 81%, t(163)= 3.95, p<.001). Accuracy was marginally different across 
comparison conditions, F(6, 156)= 1.86, p=.092, ηp2=.067, however posthoc comparisons (with 
Bonferroni corrections) did not reveal differences between conditions. We included MA 
accuracy as a covariate in all other analyses and the patterns were not different, so differences in 
accuracy will not be discussed further.   
  Self Evaluations. See Table 2 for means and standard deviations for Study 1 dependent 
measures. We first calculated a score performance self-esteem subscale from the SSES 
(Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; α=.79) and conducted an ANOVA. No significant effect of 
condition emerged, F(6, 154)= 1.42, p=.211, ηp2=.052.   
As a secondary test, we averaged participants’ ratings of their performance, satisfaction, 
and MA ability to create a self-evaluation composite (α= .76). An ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of comparison condition on self-evaluations, F(6, 155)= 3.75, p=.002, ηp2= .127. Planned 
comparisons were conducted to test for the specific a priori predictions described above.  
Did women assimilate to other women? No, we did not see evidence of assimilation. 
Participants who compared to an ingroup upward target (M=3.94, SD= .85) rated themselves less 
favorably than the baseline control (M=4.49, SD= .76; p=.011, d= -.68). Additionally, when 
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compared to the no-comparison control, participants rated themselves marginally more favorably 
when they had an ingroup downward target (M=4.86, SD= .55,p=.086, d= .56). In other words, 
instead of finding assimilation to ingroup members like predicted, we saw distinct patterns of 
contrast from ingroup members. Participants rated themselves as being different from co-
participants who were also women. Even if we did not include a baseline control group, we 
would not have seen what looked like patterns of assimilation: participants comparing to only a 
female co-participant provided less favorable self-evaluations when comparing to an upward 
comparison target than when comparing to a downward comparison target (p<.001, d= -1.29). 
Did women contrast from men? No. Participants who compared only to male 
confederates did not rate themselves differently from the control (ps=.349 & .107, ds= -.64 & 
.30) whether it was downward comparison information (M=4.87, SD= .63) or upward 
comparison information (M=4.28, SD= .84). In other words, finding out that they had performed 
better or worse than an outgroup member did not yield different self-evaluations than finding out 
no social comparison information at all. Had we not included our control group, we would have 
observed a pattern that might have looked like contrast; participants comparing to just a male 
confederate rated themselves more favorably when they had downward comparison 
information  than upward  p=.023, d= .79). 
Did women “shift standards” when they compared to women and men?  No. 
Participants rated themselves similarly when they had both ingroup and outgroup comparisons 
whether it was the female co-participant who had performed better (M=4.41, SD= .98) or the 
male confederate who had performed better (M= 4.47, SD= .75, p= .805, d= -.07). Additionally, 
participants did not rate themselves differently from control when they had both ingroup and 
outgroup comparisons, regardless of the comparison direction (p’s= .699 & .909, ds= .10 & .03).  
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Does comparison information from a man change how comparison information from a 
woman is used? Maybe, but not in the predicted direction. The bidirectional comparison 
conditions did appear to dampen any effects of the unidirectional comparison conditions. When 
participants compared to both an upward female target and downward male target, they rated 
themselves more favorably than when they compared only to an upward female target (p=.038, 
d= .51). In other words, outperforming an outgroup member seemed to buffer against the effects 
of underperforming compared to an ingroup member. When participants compared to both an 
upward male target and a downward female target, they rated themselves marginally less 
favorably (p=.092, d= -.59) than when comparing just to a downward female target; in this case, 
underperforming an outgroup member seemed to take away the benefit of outperforming an 
ingroup member.  
Perceptions of Modular Arithmetic. Participants’ general rating of MA and their rating 
of MA compared to standard math were averaged to create a composite (α=.71) in which higher 
scores indicate a more favorable perception of MA. A significant main effect of comparison 
condition emerged, F(6, 155)= 2.65, p=.018, ηp2=.093. Post hoc analyses (using Bonferroni 
corrections) suggested that participants who had outperformed a female co-participant (M=3.19, 
SD= 1.02) had more positive perceptions of the modular arithmetic task than participants who 
had been outperformed by a male confederate (M=2.16, SD= 0.82, p=.011, d= 1.11). Significant 
differences between the other conditions did not emerge.      
Discussion  
Overall, our results did not support our predictions that participants would assimilate to 
ingroup members unless an outgroup member was present. Instead, we saw evidence of contrast 
effects; specifically, participants felt marginally better when they outperformed an ingroup 
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member, and felt worse about their own performance (versus the control) when outperformed by 
an ingroup member. This finding is inconsistent with previous research that has demonstrated 
assimilation to ingroup members (Blanton et al., 2000; Hall & Crisp, 2008; Ledgerwood & 
Chaiken, 2007; Redersdorf & Martinot, 2009), and is inconsistent with a pattern of self-
enhancement in which people might be more likely to assimilate to upward targets and contrast 
from downward. One potential explanation for our different results was our population. For 
example, Blanton et al. (2000) studied African American women who were comparing to other 
African American women or white women when they found patterns of ingroup assimilation. As 
suggested by Blanton (2001), race might function differently from gender as a cue of similarity 
that could lead to assimilation or contrast. However, other research suggests that gender should 
be experienced in the same way as any other grouping variable (e.g., Hall & Crisp, 2008; Marx 
et al., 2005; Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007).  
Additionally, we saw only weak evidence that people contrast from outgroup members. 
Participants rated themselves more favorably when they outperformed a male co-participant 
(versus control), but did not rate themselves less favorably (versus control) when outperformed 
by a male co-participant. This, again, is inconsistent with previous research that suggests we are 
more likely to contrast away from outgroup members (Blanton et al., 2000; Hall & Crisp, 2008; 
Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007; Redersdorf & Martinot, 2009). Although, this pattern is 
consistent with self-enhancement in that participants did not report feeling worse than a baseline 
control when comparing with better-or-worse-off outgroup members. One potential explanation 
for our pattern of results was that we used a no-comparison control group. If the present study 
had not included this control group, we would see patterns that seem to resemble contrast effects 
when comparing to outgroup members; performing better than a man led to more favorable self-
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evaluations than performing worse than a man. However, the inclusion of the no-comparison 
control group demonstrates that only comparing to a worse-off target led to contrast effects, and 
that comparing to a better off target did not negatively affect self-evaluations. Given this 
difference between our study and the others described, it is possible that the original studies were 
misinterpreted.  
Finally, we did not see evidence that comparing to both ingroup and outgroup members 
changed the way ingroup comparison information was used. We hypothesized that the presence 
of an outgroup member would lead people to contrast away from their ingroup members, 
whether through a process of competition or because they provided a more relevant point of 
comparison. However, self-evaluations in the conditions where both ingroup and outgroup 
members were not different from each other or baseline control group. Beyond this, when 
comparing the bidirectional and unidirectional conditions, we saw evidence that the outgroup 
member was the comparison target that mattered more than the ingroup member and not the 
other way around; for example, performing better than a male co-participant and worse than a 
female co-participant led to more favorable self-evaluations than just performing worse than a 
female co-participant. This pattern of results is the opposite of what we would have predicted 
based on prior research by Blanton et al. (2002) that suggested that when stereotype salience or 
endorsement was high, women “shifted standards” to contrast with other women when 
comparison information with men was also present.  
One potential issue with our study was that we did not measure whether our participants 
were aware of or endorsed the stereotype that women are bad at math. This is an issue because if 
our participants were not aware of the stereotype, our stereotype threat manipulation might not 
have been effective, and gender might not have been a salient enough feature to lead to 
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assimilation effects. Additionally, Blanton et al. (2002) demonstrated that shifting standards was 
more likely for women who endorsed this stereotype. Considering that women who were told 
they were outperformed by men had more negative attitudes about the modular arithmetic task 
than women who thought they had outperformed another woman, it is possible that in general 
our participants did not endorse the stereotype that men are better at math.  
Study 2 
Overview 
The purpose of Study 2 was to provide an additional test of whether women would 
assimilate to ingroup comparison information and contrast from outgroup situation when a 
gender stereotype was made salient. In Study 2, we adjusted our comparison information so that 
it was given in the form of percentiles and not just raw scores. The use of university-wide 
percentile feedback information rather than percentage score feedback from a present co-
participant allowed for a standardization of all conditions so that only one participant was 
involved in the experiment at a time. Additionally, we hoped that the percentile information 
would make the comparison feedback more ambiguous which should allow for assimilation.  
Additionally, to make stereotype threat more salient, all experimenters in Study 2 were 
male. Keller and Sekequaptewa (2008) demonstrated that threat can be induced for women if 
they are the only women in the room; as such, having a male experimenter should have induced 
threat for all participants, whereas in Study 1, participants were never the only woman in the 
room. We also altered several items on the MA task from Study 1 that were answered correctly 
by most participants in order to make them more difficult, and in order to make the task more 
threatening.  Finally, we included measures of ingroup identification and stereotype endorsement 
as potential moderators of the social comparison effects.  
RUNNING HEAD: Comparing to the ingroup versus the outgroup 
Method 
 Participants and Design. Female undergraduate students (N=86, 52.2% non-white, Mage= 
18.78 years, SDage= 0.94 years) participated in exchange for partial course credit. Participants 
arrived at the session alone, were greeted by a male experimenter and were randomly assigned to 
one of five comparison conditions: control, female upward, female downward, male upward, 
male downward. 
Materials and Procedure. Study 2 followed the same procedures as Study 1 except for 
the following changes.  
Modular Arithmetic Exam. Participants learned how to complete MA items through the 
same instructions as Study 1. The only difference between the MA exam for Study 2 was that 12 
of the 50 items were altered to increase their difficulty. 
Social Comparison Feedback. When participants had completed the MA exam on the 
computer, they read that they would be shown percentile infographics displaying how their 
performance compared to their university’s female and male student populations; they read that 
they should pay careful attention to this information because they would be asked questions 
about it. 
On the next screen, the infographic was pre-generated with bogus percentile feedback 
information. Participants always learned that they scored 81% correct on the MA task (as in 
Study 1); depending on condition, they also learned that they were in the 53rd or 91st percentile 
for males or females at their university. While two boxes always appeared as if two infographics 
(one for male and one for female) would be displayed, one of the boxes would be grayed out as if 
the image could not load on the computer (See Figure 1); in other words, participants received 
only male or female percentile feedback information to compare to, never both. In the control 
RUNNING HEAD: Comparing to the ingroup versus the outgroup 
condition, it appeared as if neither image could load and they received no comparison 
information. If the participant brought the image “issue” to the attention of the experimenter, the 
experimenter responded as if it was an accident and say, “Oh that’s strange. You are supposed to 
get information about the breakdown for both males and females. I guess just keep going and I’ll 
make sure the principal researcher knows about this.” 
 Dependent Measures.  
 Self-evaluations. Following the infographic display, participants completed self-
evaluations on the computer. As in Study 1, they rated their MA performance, satisfaction with 
their performance on the MA task, and general MA ability (1= extremely poor/dissatisfied, 7= 
extremely good/satisfied). Furthermore, they rated their general math ability in comparison to 
female and male students at their university, and in general  (1= much worse, 7= much better). 
Participants also completed the 7-item performance self-esteem measure from Study 1 
(Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).  
 Stereotype endorsement. Participants indicated whether they were aware of any 
stereotypes about gender and math (yes or no), and how much they agree with the statement that 
“women are worse at math than men” (1= completely disagree, 7 = completely agree). 
Participants also indicated how important their gender and math ability were to their identity (1= 
extremely unimportant, 7= extremely important). Finally, participants were asked to recall their 
score and percentile information, were probed for suspicion, and were debriefed. 
 Results & Discussion 
Manipulation Check. All but six participants accurately recalled their score on the 
modular arithmetic task. The six participants who mis-remembered instead recalled their 
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percentile information and indicated that they scored either 53% or 91%. Removing these 
participants from the data set did not change the results of the study, so they were left in.  
MA Accuracy. Despite attempts to make the modular arithmetic task more difficult in 
the second study, participants actually performed better on it than they did in the first study. On 
average, participants answered 88.18% of the items correctly (SD= 11.81%); accuracy did not 
differ across conditions, F<1.  
Self Evaluations. As in Study 1, we calculated a score on the performance self-esteem 
measure (α= .81); however, there was no evidence of an effect of the comparison manipulation 
on state self esteem, F<1. Again, we averaged participants’ ratings of their performance, 
satisfaction, and MA ability to create a self-evaluation composite (α= .87). An ANOVA revealed 
a significant effect of comparison condition on self-evaluations, F(4, 81)= 10.66, p<.001, ηp2= 
.345. Specific planned comparisons were conducted based on our a priori research questions. See 
Table 3.  
Did women assimilate to other women? No, as in Study 1, we did not see evidence of 
assimilation. Participants with downward female comparison information (M=5.26, SD= 1.32) 
rated themselves more favorably than the control (M= 3.80, SD= 1.09, p<.001, d= 1.21) but 
participants with upward female comparison information (M=4.20, SD= 1.01) did not rate 
themselves differently from the control group (p=.291, d= .38). In other words, we do not see 
symmetrical contrast effects; instead, we see that people are more likely to contrast away from 
downward comparison information than upward.  
Did women contrast from men? Yes, but only when they outperformed their outgroup 
members. Participants with only male percentile information rated themselves more favorably 
when they had downward comparison information (M= 5.73, SD= .77) than if they did not have 
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comparison information (p<.001, d= 2.05). Participants who had male upward comparison 
information (M= 3.98, SD= 1.10) did not rate themselves differently from control (p=.634, 
d=.16). As with the participants with female percentile information, only the downward 
comparison condition was different from control.  
Whether participants were comparing with the ingroup or the outgroup, we see patterns 
of self-enhancement. Overall, relative to control, participants rated themselves no differently 
after comparing to upward targets, but more favorably after comparing to downward targets.   
Did stereotype awareness or endorsement moderate these effects? No. While 73.3% of 
participants indicated that they were aware of a stereotype about gender and math, there was not 
a significant stereotype awareness x comparison condition interaction, F(4, 75)=1.05, p=.390, 
ηp2=.053. Additionally, stereotype endorsement did not moderate the effects on self-evaluations, 
F(15,62)= 1.48, p=.14, ηp2= .264. However, this could be due to a floor effect; 41.9% of 
participants indicated that they “completely disagreed” with the stereotype that women are worse 
at math than men. Only 7% of participants indicated any endorsement (“slightly agree”) of the 
stereotype.  
As a secondary test, we examined whether being a STEM major moderated the 
comparison effects on self-evaluations; there is evidence that women who are more strongly 
identified with math experience stronger threat effects (e.g., Nguyen & Ryan, 2008). Again, 
there was no evidence of either a main effect of being a STEM major, or a STEM major x 
comparison condition interaction, Fs<1.  
Relative Math Ability. We did not find evidence of an effect of comparison condition on 
participants’ ratings of their math ability compared to their typical female classmate, or to the 
typical man or woman in general (Fs<1). However, an ANOVA did reveal a main effect of 
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comparison condition on participants’ ratings of their math ability compared to their typical male 
classmate, F(4, 79)= 2.52, p=.048, ηp2= .113. Post hoc tests (using Bonferroni corrections) 
indicate that participants who received downward male percentile information were marginally 
more likely to agree with the statement that they had better math ability than their male 
classmates (M= 4.71, SD= .92) than participants who received female upward percentile 
information (M=3.76, SD= 0.97; p=.068, d=1.00). This response is logical considering that these 
participants received feedback telling them they had better ability than their male classmates, 
however, we do not see similar “logical” effects for students in the other conditions.  
Better than Average Effects. One potential reason that our comparison conditions 
generally did not affect people’s ratings of their math abilities is that people are instead 
demonstrating better than average effects. Responses to the comparative questions were 
subjected to a one-sample t-test compared to the value of 4 (the midpoint of the scale). 
Participants across conditions rated themselves as having better math ability than the average 
woman at their university (M= 4.24, SD= 1.02, t(84)= 2.13, p=.036, d=.24), and better than the 
average woman in general (M= 4.51, SD= 1.06, t(85)= 4.48, p<.001, d=.49). However, 
participants did not rate their math ability differently from the average man at their university 
(M= 4.04, SD= 1.02, t(83)= .32, p=.750, d=.04) or from the average man in general (M= 4.18, 
SD= 1.03, t(84)= .84, p=.116, d=.18).   
While most participants did not explicitly report endorsing the gender math stereotype, 
these comparative judgments tell a different story; participants think they have equal ability to 
most men, but better ability than most women suggesting that they do think there is a gender 
difference in math ability. As such, we tested the relative math ability judgments as a moderator 
for the social comparison effects, but no significant effects emerged (F<1).  
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General Discussion 
 Across two studies, we tested how women use social comparison information from other 
women and/or from men after completing a threatening math test. Overall, we did not see strong 
evidence that the group membership of the comparison targets affected self-evaluations. Nor did 
we see evidence that people used comparison information from ingroup versus outgroup 
members differently. Instead, we saw evidence that comparing to worse-off others-- whether 
they were ingroup or outgroup members-- led to more favorable self-evaluations.  
 Our results our inconsistent with previous research that suggests that people are likely to 
assimilate to similar or ingroup comparison targets (e.g., Blanton et al., 2000; Mussweiler et al., 
2004). Additionally, our results were inconsistent with prior work that demonstrates that women 
contrast from other women in stereotype threat situations when men are also present (Blanton et 
al., 2002). Our studies, and our different results, could be due to a number of factors. First, across 
both studies, we were relying on gender as our grouping variable. Most of the work on 
intergroup comparisons described above does not examine gender, and some argue that gender is 
not a distinct enough social category to indicate group membership (Blanton, 2001). As such, 
future research should test this idea more specifically by comparing gender groupings to other 
types of groupings (e.g., by race or ethnicity).  
 Second, our studies were different specifically from research examining stereotype threat 
and social comparison in that we did not manipulate stereotype threat; instead, all of our 
participants were in a situation designed to induce stereotype threat. In both studies, we used 
threat paradigms and materials that have been successful for other researchers, but it is possible 
that our participants did not experience stereotype threat as we designed. Indeed, most of our 
participants did not report endorsing the stereotype that women are not as good at math as men 
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(Study 2), and were less likely to believe our math task to be credible if they were outperformed 
by a man (Study 1). According to Nguyen and Ryan (2008), subtle manipulations of threat work 
better for the gender/math stereotype, so perhaps the present manipulation (though adapted from 
other research) was too overt for this population. It is possible that gender could be a grouping 
variable if it is made salient through a stereotype threat manipulation, so future research should 
examine this as a potential explanation for why our results were inconsistent with previous 
research.  
 Third, when considering how our findings compare to those of Blanton et al. (2002),  it 
may be relevant to consider the potential shift in gender stereotype awareness over the last 15 
years. It is possible that the social context surrounding these gender stereotypes has changed 
reflecting social progress. While findings from Blanton et al. (2002) suggest that when women 
reject the stereotype that men are better at math, they are more likely to assimilate to other 
women and thereby feel a boost of pride in their social identity, in 2018 those assimilation 
effects are not so evident. However, this may reflect that women no longer use gender as a frame 
of reference when making comparisons about their own abilities in various tasks. Indeed, we did 
not see evidence that participants explicitly endorsed the stereotype that men are better at math 
than women. However, we did still see some evidence that this stereotype is endorsed at a more 
implicit level; our participants considered themselves to be better than other women at math, but 
not any different in skill level than men. Indirectly, this suggests that they believe at some level 
that men are more skilled at math than women. It will be important for future research to 
consider how stereotypes surrounding gender and math continue to change over time. 
Self-Enhancing Social Comparisons 
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We did see evidence consistent with prior research that people are likely to contrast away 
from their outgroup members. And, more specifically, through the use of a no-comparison 
control group, we mostly saw evidence of asymmetrical contrast effects; that is, participants 
were more likely to contrast away from downward comparison targets than upward targets. 
People often argue that having an upward comparison as a role model is a strong intervention for 
stereotype threat (e.g., Herrmann, Adelman, Bodford, Graudejus, Okun, & Kwan, 2016); 
however, the present research would suggest that having downward comparisons (regardless of 
gender) might actually make women feel better about their math abilities. Across both studies, 
we found results that are consistent with self-enhancement. While it is not clear that our 
participants were experiencing threat, there is a plethora of research suggesting that self-
enhancement is a common outcome of social comparisons even in the absence of a threat; people 
are particularly likely to use comparison information from downward comparison targets to self-
enhance or repair self-esteem (e.g., Wills, 1981). These kinds of self-enhancing downward 
comparisons can happen even with irrelevant comparison targets; Zell, Alicke, and Strickhouser 
(2015) found that people evaluate themselves more favorably after comparing to a downward 
comparison target even if that target is considered incompetent. Downward targets in Study 1 
were scoring 64%, not a performance that would be considered “good” by participants, yet we 
still see that participants rate their own abilities more favorably after comparing to the downward 
targets than a baseline control.  
We also see evidence of self-enhancement in the conditions in which participants 
received upward comparison information. Barring one exception, participants in both studies 
who received upward comparison information did not feel any worse about themselves than 
participants in the no-comparison control group. This type of self-enhancement would not be 
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visible without the no-comparison control group, again highlighting how important control 
groups are for interpreting social comparison effects (see Bruchmann, 2017; Gerber, Wheeler, & 
Suls, 2018). Yet, self-enhancing after comparing to upward targets is not uncommon. When 
faced with threatening upward social comparison information, people often self-repair or self-
enhance by improving future performance (Johnson, 2012), discounting the upward comparison 
target (Alicke, LoSchiavo, Zerbst, & Zhang, 1997; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997), or disengaging 
from the task (see Johnson, 2012 for a review). Additionally, in Study 2, we saw evidence of 
self-enhancement through Better than Average effects; our participants indicated that they were 
better at math than most women in general and at their university, and had the same level of 
math skills as most men in general and at their university.  
Conclusion 
Across these two studies which built upon previous social comparison and stereotype 
threat research, we did not see evidence for assimilation to ingroup members or a shifting of 
standards driving contrast from ingroup members. Instead, we saw strong and consistent 
evidence of contrast away from comparison targets regardless of group membership; 
additionally, because of our control group, we saw evidence of mostly downward contrast, not 
upward. In other words, comparing to worse-off others led to more favorable self-impressions 
than a baseline control, whereas comparing to better-off others did not generally lead to less 
favorable self-impressions. While previous research would suggest that the group membership of 
the comparison targets matters for self-evaluations, our studies provide evidence that it is the 
direction of the comparison targets that matters for self-evaluations.  
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Figure 1. Example comparison feedback for Study 2; female-downward and male-upward 
conditions.  
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Table 1       
Score and Comparison Feedback across Study 1 and Study 2     










Control 81% -- -- 81% -- -- 
Female Upward 









Male Upward 81% -- 98% 81% -- 91st percentile 
Male Downward 
81% -- 64% 81% -- 
53rd 
percentile 
Female Upward,  
Male Downward 
81% 98% 64% -- -- -- 
Male Upward, 
Female Downward 
81% 64% 98% -- -- -- 
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Table 2    





Composite Perceptions of MA 
Control 27.35 (3.32) 4.49 (0.76) 2.90 (0.80) 
Female Upward 25.63 (3.51) 3.94 (0.85) 2.91 (0.83) 
Male Upward 25.79 (4.08) 4.28 (0.84) 2.16 (0.82) 
Female Downward 26.38 (3.37) 4.86 (0.55) 3.19 (1.02) 
Male Downward 26.44 (3.29) 4.87 (0.63) 2.58 (1.07) 
Female Upward, Male 
Downward 24.48 (5.23) 4.41 (0.98) 2.54 (1.12) 
Female Downward, Male 
Upward 26.41 (3.81) 4.47 (0.75) 2.80 (0.95) 
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Table 3   
Study 2 Means and Standard Deviations across Comparison Conditions 
Comparison Condition Performance Self-Esteem 
Self-Evaluation 
Composite 
Control 24.65 (4.78) 3.80 (1.09) 
Female Upward 24.65 (4.31) 4.20 (1.01) 
Male Upward 26.18 (4.20) 3.98 (1.10) 
Female Downward 26.06 (5.45) 5.26 (1.32) 
Male Downward 25.76 (4.55) 5.73 (.77) 
 
 
 
